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DEBT FINANCING AND FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY 
Evidence from Pro-active Leverage Increases 
 
Abstract 
Firms that intentionally increase leverage through substantial debt issuances do so primarily as a 
response to operating needs rather than a desire to make a large equity payout.  Subsequent debt 
reductions are neither rapid, nor the result of pro-active attempts to rebalance the firm’s capital 
structure towards a long-run target.  Instead, the evolution of the firm’s leverage ratio depends 
primarily on whether or not the firm produces a financial surplus.  In fact, firms that generate 
subsequent deficits tend to cover these deficits predominantly with more debt even though they 
exhibit leverage ratios that are well above estimated target levels.  While many of our findings 
are difficult to reconcile with traditional capital structure models, they are broadly consistent 
with a capital structure theory in which financial flexibility, in the form of unused debt capacity, 




  The search for an empirically viable capital structure theory has confounded financial 
economists for decades.  Standard trade-off models of capital structure have been criticized on 
the grounds that they do a poor job of explaining observed debt ratios.  For example, traditional 
trade-off models have difficulty explaining why firms tend to issue stock after exogenous 
decreases in leverage (i.e. stock price run-ups), why leverage ratios are negatively related to 
profitability, and why firms seem to forego potentially large interest tax shields.
1  To address 
these shortcomings, financial economists have increasingly turned to dynamic models that 
incorporate financing frictions, frictions in real investment, or both.
2  Although these models take 
different forms, a common theme is that they attempt to provide a rational explanation for 
observed discontinuities in financing behavior. 
  We contribute to this literature by studying a particular financing discontinuity – namely, 
large, pro-active increases in leverage.  Our experimental design isolates those cases in which 
firms deliberately increase their leverage through substantial new borrowings.  We then analyze 
why these firms choose to increase leverage and how their capital structures evolve over the 
subsequent years.  Our focus on large increases in leverage stems in part from the observation 
that these transactions are particularly puzzling for capital structure theory.  Even in the presence 
of frictions, capital structure models, particularly those that rely on adjustment costs, generally 
predict that management-initiated debt issues will decrease the firm’s deviation from its target 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Baker and Wurgler (2002), Fama and French (2005), and Welch (2004) for evidence and 
discussion of firms issuing common stock after exogenous decreases in leverage; Strebulaev (2007) for a discussion 
of the negative relation between leverage and profitability; and Graham (2000) for estimates of the magnitude of 
interest tax shield foregone by the average firm.   
 
2 Perhaps the earliest example in this literature is Fisher, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989).  More recent examples 
include Leary and Roberts (2005), Strebulaev (2007), Tserlukevich (2008), Dudley (2009), and DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Whited (2010). 
 [2] 
 
leverage ratio.  Yet, Hovakimian (2004) finds that, on average, debt issues tend to increase the 
deviation of the firm’s debt ratio from its estimated target.   
Our sample consists of 2,318 instances between 1971 and 1999 in which firms 
substantially increase their total debt and for which the resulting market leverage ratio (defined 
as total debt over total debt plus the market value of equity) is at least 0.10 above our estimate of 
their long-run target debt ratio.  In other words, the sample debt increases are deliberate increases 
in leverage (as opposed to leverage changes that result from exogenous changes in stock price) 
that lead to large deviations from estimated target leverage ratios.  These pro-active debt issues 
that move the firm away from target leverage are precisely the types of events that are most 
puzzling for traditional capital structure models.  On average, the sample firms increase their 
ratio of debt to value by 0.24, resulting in a leverage ratio that is 0.27 above their estimated 
target. 
  Our analysis indicates that the debt increases are primarily a response to operating needs 
rather than a desire to either swap equity for debt or to make a large cash payout.  Of the 1,920 
leverage increases for which we can accurately track the use of funds, we identify investment 
(primarily acquisitions and increased capital expenditures) as the primary use of funds in 1,058 
(55%) cases.  In another 687 (36%) cases, the funds are primarily used for increases in net 
working capital (primarily increases in accounts receivable and inventory), while in 94 (5%), the 
proceeds of the debt issue are used to cover reductions in operating profitability.  The cases in 
which the primary use of funds is to make a payout to shareholders number just 81, comprising 
only 4% of the total.  We conclude, therefore, that the observed leverage increases are primarily 
driven by a need for funds that is related to changes in the firm’s investment opportunity set or 
(to a lesser extent) its flow of earnings.  In fact, our analysis reveals that more than 90% of the [3] 
 
sample firms would have been unable to pursue their operating policies without the proceeds 
from the debt issuance.   
  In the years subsequent to the initial jump in leverage, the sample firms reduce their 
leverage, on average.  However, the subsequent debt reductions are neither rapid, nor the result 
of pro-active attempts (e.g. equity issues) to rebalance the firm’s capital structure towards its 
long-run target.  For those firms that survive for at least seven years, the excess leverage ratio 
(actual – target) declines substantially, but still remains a significantly positive 0.11.  More 
interestingly, the evolution of the firm’s leverage ratio appears to depend primarily on whether or 
not the firm produces a financial surplus (i.e. cash flow in excess of dividends, capital 
expenditures, and investments in working capital).  As in Byoun (2008), firms that produce a 
surplus tend to use that surplus primarily for debt reduction rather than for increases in equity 
payouts or increases in the firm’s cash balance.  Moreover, we see little evidence of pro-active 
efforts (beyond the application of a surplus) to reduce the firm’s leverage.  In fact, firms that 
generate deficits tend to cover the deficit predominantly with more debt even though these firms 
exhibit leverage ratios that are already well above estimated target levels.   
Although our analysis is not intended to formally test specific models of financing 
behavior, our study highlights a number of empirical regularities that are relevant for capital 
structure research.  First, though most trade-off models predict that large leverage increases of 
the type that we study will generally represent movements towards a (possibly new) target 
leverage ratio, our sample leverage increases appear to represent deliberate movements away 
from estimates of the target leverage ratio.  Second, although the subsequent rebalancing that we 
observe is consistent with the existence of a long-run target debt ratio, the speed of adjustment is 
sufficiently slow and the adjustment process sufficiently passive so as to suggest that movement [4] 
 
towards the estimated target leverage ratio is not a first-order consideration for the sample firms.  
Third, we find little evidence that the sample firms use surpluses to stockpile cash, but they often 
use surpluses to increase equity payouts (repurchases and dividend increases) when they could 
otherwise have retired debt.  
These regularities are consistent with many of the features of a model in which financial 
flexibility in the form of unused debt capacity plays a central role in capital structure dynamics.  
This role is modeled in a recent study by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2010).  In their 
model, firms have low long run leverage targets and debt issues represent pro-active responses to 
shocks to the firm’s investment opportunity set.  Rebalancing back to the low target can occur 
either slowly through regular principal and interest payments, or more aggressively if the firm 
has positive free cash flow realizations.  In this setup, firms do not stockpile cash because doing 
so engenders agency and tax costs.  Many of our findings conform closely to these predictions in 
that the sample debt increases are driven primarily by investment needs, while subsequent 
rebalancing towards the estimated target leverage ratio depends primarily on whether the firm’s 
operations generate a financial surplus.  Nonetheless, our finding that the sample firms often 
increase equity payouts when they could have more rapidly adjusted towards their target 
leverage ratio implies a more complicated rebalancing process than that predicted in DeAngelo 
et al. (2010).   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 details our sample 
selection process and describes the sample leverage increases.  In Section 3, we present evidence 
on the dynamics of capital structure in the years following the initial increase in leverage.   
Section 4 discusses our findings in the context of existing capital structure theories and relates 
our findings to those of other studies of leverage adjustments.  Section 5 concludes. [5] 
 
 
2.  Sample Selection and Description of Leverage Changes 
2.1  Identifying pro-active leverage changes 
The starting sample consists of all U.S firms with total assets greater than $10 million 
between 1971 and 1999.  We truncate the sample at 1999 to allow for the possibility of as many 
as seven years of data subsequent to the jump in leverage.  This allows us to track the evolution 
of leverage in the post-jump years.  Note, however, that we do not require that firms have the full 
seven years of data in order to be included in the sample.  The data are obtained from the 
Compustat database, Industrial Annual file.  Financial firms (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and 
regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900 – 4999) are excluded as are firms missing data necessary for 
the calculation of leverage ratios.   
We follow Harford et al. (2009) in our definition of market leverage and estimation of 
long run target leverage: 
                    
 9         3 4   
 9         3 4         199   x  25   
 
where Dx is a COMPUSTAT annual data item. D9 is the amount of long-term debt exceeding 
maturity of one year, D34 is debt in current liabilities, including the portion of long-term due 
within one year, D199 is the year-end common share price and D25 is the year-end number of 
common shares outstanding.  Equation (1) is hereafter abbreviated (ML), the numerator is 
referred to as total debt (TD), and the denominator is referred to as market assets (MA).
3 
                                                 
3 We also conduct all of our tests using a book leverage ratio, total debt divided by total asset.  Because our results 
are not materially different using the book leverage measure, we report only the results using market leverage 




  Our research design requires the computation of a proxy for the long-run target leverage 
ratio.  We estimate a double-sided tobit regression model censored at 0 and 1 for each year 
contained in the sample using the following regression specification: 
MLit = α+β1[Med Ind ML]i,t-1+β2[M/B]i,t-1+β3[FA/TA]i,t-1+β4[OI/TA]i,t-1+β5[ln(TA)]i,t-1+ε 
Our selection of independent variables is motivated by Frank and Goyal (2009), who find 
that the most reliable factors influencing leverage decisions among US publicly traded firms are: 
median industry leverage (Med Ind ML), market-to-book ratio (M/B), asset tangibility (FA/TA), 
profitability (OI/TA), size (ln(TA)) and expected inflation.  By estimating separate annual 
regressions, we are able to exclude expected inflation from the model as this variable is uniform 
across all firms within each year.
4  The other five variables are computed a follows: 
The median industry leverage is computed each year for each four digit SIC code.  We 
require that there be at least ten observations to use the median four digit SIC leverage.  When 
the four digit code lacks ten observations, we use the median within the three digit code.  If the 
three digit code also lacks ten observations, we use the median of the two digit code.
5 
Market-to-book ratio is computed as: 
 /      
 6      216      3 5         199   x  25         1 0   
 6   
 
where D6 is total assets, D216 is book equity, D35 is deferred tax and D10 is liquidation value of 
preferred stock.  We substitute D56, redemption value of preferred stock, when D10 is missing. 
  As a proxy for asset tangibility, we use the ratio of D8, fixed assets, over total assets.  To 
measure profitability, we use the ratio of D13, operating income, over total assets.  Size is 
measured as the natural log of total assets. 
                                                 
4 We also estimate target leverage ratios using the full panel rather than separate annual regressions.  Because these 
results are nearly identical, we do not report them in the paper. 
 
5 We use four-digit SIC codes for 38% of the observations, three-digit codes for 28% of the observations, and two-




To identify the sample firms that increase leverage sufficiently so as to deviate 
substantially from target, we require that the change in leverage be at least 0.10 and that the post-
jump leverage to be at least 0.10 above target.  The difference between a firm’s observed 
leverage and target leverage in a given year is hereafter referred to as excess leverage. 
Our research design focuses on increases in leverage that are pro-active in nature.  That 
is, we require the leverage increase to be predominantly the result of a debt increase as opposed 
to an exogenous decline in equity value.  This requirement poses a difficult empirical challenge 
because both the numerator and denominator of the leverage ratio are typically changing.  We 
cannot simply screen out large decreases in market equity because the decrease may be the result 
of a deliberate action such as an abnormally large payout.  By the same token, we cannot simply 
assume constant market equity because large market equity increases may result from deliberate 
actions such as pursuing acquisitions or other positive NPV investments.  To circumvent these 
difficulties while achieving our desired sample composition, we develop a variable, $∆ML, that 
captures the value of additional debt represented by the change in leverage normalized by the 
change in value of market assets.  Specifically, 
$∆                   ,     1  
    
   ,     1 
  
  To isolate firms whose leverage shifts are driven predominantly by an increase in debt, 
we require that the change in total debt be at least 90% of $∆ML. 
For firms that exhibit more than one jump during the seven year tracking period, we 
ignore jumps subsequent to the first jump to avoid double counting.  We note, however, that 
these subsequent jumps are captured by our analysis of post-jump adjustment.  After the seven-
year tracking period, firms executing a subsequent jump are treated as an additional observation. 
(4) [8] 
 
In order to allow for an analysis of the motivation for these leverage changes, we screen 
the sample based on the availability of Statement of Cash Flows (SCF) data.  Further, we impose 
the requirement that at least 80% of the increase in debt observed on the balance sheet must be 
readily identified on the SCF.  This set of requirements results in a sample of 2,318 observations, 
comprised of 2,166 unique firms.  The motivation for the 80% screen is two-fold.  First, it allows 
for an analysis of the use of debt proceeds by tracking the cash.  Second, it isolates firms that 
increased leverage through an issuance of debt, which we consider pro-active, as opposed to 
acquisition of debt via merger and acquisition activity. 
Figure 1 plots the annual frequency of pro-active leverage changes.  Although there is 
some clustering of observations in 1973-74, 1984-1987, and 1998, the data indicate that large, 
pro-active leverage increases are fairly pervasive through time.  It is notable that among the set 
of firms that are listed on Compustat for any number of years that qualify for inclusion during 
our sample period, over 20% appear in our sample.  This suggests that the phenomena of large 
scale leverage increases are not rare events.   
We also find that that large increases in leverage are widely distributed across industries.  
With the exception of the five industries that we exclude by construction (Banking, Trading, 
Insurance, Real Estate & Utilities), all of the 48 industries defined by Fama and French are 
represented in the sample.  (These data are not reported in a table.)  Further, no single industry 
dominates the sample.  Only five industries comprise greater than 5% of the sample and no 
industry accounts for more than 10%.  When compared to the population of firms over the same 
period, our sample follows a remarkably similar distribution.   
 
2.2  Description of Leverage Changes [9] 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the magnitude of the leverage changes.  Prior to 
the leverage increase, the median firm exhibits a leverage ratio of 0.30.  This increases to a 
median of 0.55 after the leverage increase.  Before the leverage shift, the median firm exhibits a 
leverage ratio nearly identical to the target, rising to 0.24 above the target ex post.  Thus, our 
sample selection process successfully identifies pro-active leverage increases that are 
economically meaningful.  Nonetheless, our sample leverage changes are smaller than those 
observed in prior studies that narrowly focus on highly-leveraged transactions (HLTs).   
Correspondingly, therefore, the number of pro-active leverage changes identified by our 
procedure is many times larger than that studied in the prior HLT studies.
6   
 
2.3  Use of proceeds 
  To shed light on the underlying motivation for the debt issuance, we evaluate the SCF 
components of our sample.  We group the firms into four main motivations for the debt issue:  (i) 
to cover an operational cash shortfall due to an earnings shock (OPERATIONS), (ii) to execute a 
payout to equityholders (PAYOUT), (iii) to fund an increase in working capital (WORKING 
CAPITAL) and (iv) to fund an investment opportunity (INVESTMENT), which may be either 
internal such as capital expenditures or external such as a cash acquisition. 
The categorization of firms into one of these four motivations is a multi-step process.  
First, we compute the total amount of cash (in dollars) used for deviations in each category: 
OPERATIONS: Operating Cash Flow (OCF) is calculated in a manner that extracts working 
capital changes to differentiate these changes from earnings shocks.
7  Generally, this means 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) and Denis & Denis (1993) which use samples sizes of 31 and 39, 
respectively. 
7 Over the sample period, firms report cash flows using different formats which are identified by Compustat data 
item 318.  This difference in reporting formats requires OCF to be calculated using different Compustat data items [10] 
 
starting with the figure reported as ‘Cash from operations’ on the SCF and then backing out 
working capital changes.  When OCF results in a negative number, this figure is considered a use 
of cash for the purpose of covering an operational cash shortfall. 
PAYOUT: The figure resulting from (Dividends+Repurchases)t – (Dividends)t-1 is considered to 
be cash used for the purpose of an equity payout increase.  Consistent with prior literature (Healy 
and Palepu 1990; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1990; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 1994), this 
effectively assumes that the expected payout at time t is equal to the dividend paid during the 
prior year. Our figure represents the deviation from the expected value. 
INVESTMENT: We calculate net investment (I) to include all cash used for investment activities 
such as capital expenditures, acquisitions and other investment activities.
8  From I, we subtract 
prior year capital expenditures to arrive at cash used to fund an increase in investment 
opportunities. 
WORKING CAPITAL: Change in working capital (∆W) is calculated independently of other 
operating activities.
9  Any positive figure of ∆W is considered a use of cash to fund working 
capital needs. 
Next, we divide the dollars used for each category by the net change in debt to identify 
the percentage of the new debt that is attributable to each motivation.  This assumes that debt 
proceeds and proceeds from other sources are used in equal proportions.  We sum the 
percentages of all categories for each firm to assess how much of the debt issue is captured 
                                                                                                                                                             
for codes 1, 2 & 3 than for code 7 to achieve a figure that is comparable across all firms in the sample.  A detailed 
description of the components in the calculation is provided in Appendix A. 
 
8 As with OCF, I must be calculated using different components depending on the value of D318.  Details are 
provided in the appendix. 
 
9 As with OCF and I, ∆W must be calculated using different components depending on the value of D318.  Details 
are provided in the appendix. [11] 
 
through this analysis.  If a given category comprises greater than 50% of the total % captured, we 
label that category as the primary use of funds.   
As an example, in 1999 General Cable Corp. increased net debt by $452 Million.  The 
proceeds were used within our four categories as follows (all dollar figures in millions, % of net 
change in debt in parentheses): OPERATIONS: $0 (they had positive operating cash flow), 
PAYOUT: $39.0 (8.6%), INVESTMENT: $398.6 (88.2%), WORKING CAPITAL: $31.8 (7.0%).  
In this example, the total percent captured sums to 103.7%.  Sums greater than 100% are not 
uncommon as firms often have additional sources of funds from operations and/or equity 
issuances.  INVESTMENT comprises 85% of the total percent captured; thus, our process flags 
INVESTMENT as the primary use of funds in this example.  A review of the annual report 
confirms that the firm made a large cash acquisition. 
  The categorization process results in the loss of 398 observations.  Firms in which no 
single motivation dominates are excluded as are firms in which we are unable to capture 50% of 
the net change in debt through the percentage use analysis.  To illustrate one example of a 
situation in which this occurs, consider a firm that has a sizable debt issue in the year prior to the 
jump and uses the cash predominantly for capital expenditures.  In the subsequent year, they 
initiate an even larger debt issue which triggers inclusion in the sample and again the proceeds 
go primarily towards capital expenditures.  The deviation in capital expenditures in this case 
would be much smaller than the jump year debt issue and thus, our method would fail to 
‘capture’ the use of cash in this firm.  We note that this is the conservative approach in that some 
firms that would otherwise be categorized as INVESTMENT may be omitted, but allows a much 
higher level of confidence that firms included in the sample are categorized correctly.   [12] 
 
Table 2 provides a time profile of the overall sample and for sub-samples based on the 
primary motivation for the leverage increase.  By far, the largest motivation is INVESTMENT, 
comprising more than all other categories combined and 55% of all observations in the sample.  
WORKING CAPITAL is the second largest at 36% of the total sample.  OPERATIONS and 
PAYOUT are the primary motivation in only a trivial number of cases, comprising 5% and 4% of 
the firms in the sample, respectively.  By contrast, prior studies on highly leveraged transactions 
(HLTs) have been limited to firms falling within the payout motivation.  As noted in Denis and 
Denis (1993), this is due primarily to the fact that the HLTs were initiated as part of a response to 
hostile takeover attempts. 
 Within  the  INVESTMENT and WORKING CAPITAL categories, there are multiple 
components driving the change.  In results not reported in a table, we find that capital 
expenditures and acquisitions make up the vast majority of net investment, accounting for 87% 
of the total.  Firms reporting under SCF format codes 1, 2 and 3 lack detailed data regarding 
changes in working capital; however, for firms reporting under code 7, the data indicate that 
increases in accounts receivable and inventory account for over two thirds of the total increase.
10 
  Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the motivation sub-categories.  The 
finding that the median % of new debt used for each motivation category exceeds 86% indicates 
that the firms have been categorized correctly.  There are no significant differences between the 
categories with respect to mean pre-jump leverage.  There are also no significant differences 
between the categories with respect to mean post-jump leverage, with the exception of the 
WORKING CAPITAL group which is slightly lower than the others, although still significantly 
above target. 
                                                 
10 281 of the 738 WORKING CAPITAL firms report under SCF code 7. [13] 
 
  In Panel B of Table 3, we report median changes for several key variables during the 
jump year.  We note that acquisitions are reported as the observed figure rather than the change.  
Each variable is scaled by total assets to facilitate comparison across firms.  The results provide 
further confirmation that we have correctly identified the primary motivations for the leverage 
increases.  At the median, the OPERATIONS category experiences a large negative shock to 
operating earnings coupled with a large decrease in working capital, the WORKING CAPITAL 
category exhibits a large positive shock to working capital, the INVESTMENT category contains 
a large positive spike to capital expenditures and acquisitions, while the PAYOUT category 
exhibits a large positive shock to observed payout. 
As further evidence on the use of funds, Panel A of Table 4 reports changes in cash 
holdings during the jump year.  These results indicate that sample firms across all categories do 
not significantly increase their cash holdings.  Rather, the median cash ratio among 
INVESTMENT category firms significantly decreases.  This implies that firms are not issuing the 
debt with the intention of stockpiling cash.  Further, in untabulated results, we find that cash 
holdings do not deviate significantly through time from the transaction year through seven years 
after the jump.   
Panel B of Table 4 follows DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010) in calculating pro 
forma cash ratios based on the condition that the firm had not executed the financing.  In other 
words, in Panel B, we analyze whether the firm could have covered the observed uses of funds 
with discretionary cash (DC).  We define pro forma DC as cash on hand at the end of the prior 
year plus operating cash flow less all cash uses other than the primary motivation.  Excess Cash 
(EC) is defined as DC less the cash used for the primary motivation.  Specifically, discretionary 
cash and excess cash are defined for each motivation category as follows: [14] 
 
INVESTMENT: 
               ,     1                         ,                 ,     1        
                   ,                 ,     1  
WORKING CAPITAL: 
               ,     1                         ,           
                    
PAYOUT: 
               ,     1                   ,     1                
                             ,           ,     1  
 
OPERATIONS: 
               ,     1               ,                  
                       
Both DC and EC are scaled by pro forma total assets, where pro forma total assets are 
computed by subtracting the net debt issuance from total assets.   
The results in Panel B of Table 4 indicate that, by and large, the sample firms could not 
have financed their uses of funds with internal sources.  The median deficit in pro forma EC/TA 
is large across all categories ranging from -0.14 to -0.26.  The percentage of firms that would 
immediately run out of cash if operating and financing policies were not altered is substantial, 
ranging from 81.7% in the OPERATIONS group to 93.8% in the WORKING CAPITAL group. 
 
3.   Post-jump rebalancing 










  In Table 5 we begin to analyze the evolution of leverage following the jump year.  Panel 
A reports a year by year evolution of the leverage for each motivation category.  Figure 2 plots 
the evolution of mean leverage, excess leverage and target leverage for the overall sample.  The 
data indicate that, on average, leverage ratios decline substantially in the seven years following 
the initial increase.  The largest group, INVESTMENT exhibits average leverage of 0.56 in the 
year of the jump and declines to 0.41 after seven years. The WORKING CAPITAL group starts at 
0.53 immediately after the leverage increasing transaction, and declines to 0.41 by seven years 
after the jump.  The OPERATIONS and PAYOUT groups also exhibit similar reductions over the 
seven years after the jump.  Despite these substantial reductions, however, all groups continue to 
exhibit significantly positive excess leverage after seven years.  Excess leverage in the 
INVESTMENT group is 0.27 in the year of the jump and is still 0.11 above the estimated target 
seven years later.  Similar results are observed in the other categories as well; excess leverage in 
the  WORKING CAPITAL, OPERATIONS and  PAYOUT groups are 0.13, 0.15 and 0.07 
respectively after seven years.  Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, target leverage ratios are 
relatively stable through the sample period.  Thus, the significantly positive excess leverage that 
we observe does not appear to be driven by time series variation in the target.
11 
One concern with these findings is that survival rates differ between categories, with the 
OPERATIONS category losing a significantly higher percentage of firms compared to the other 
categories.  To confirm that the evolution observed in Panel A is not being driven by survival 
bias, we report the mean change in leverage split by motivation over 3, 5 and 7 year time spans 
                                                 
11 Our results are robust to alternative measures of leverage and alternative estimation techniques.  Specifically, we 
separately estimate leverage using book values, using long-term debt instead of total debt, and using the log of one 
plus interest coverage (EBITDA/interest expense) instead of a debt ratio.  In addition, we estimate target leverage 
ratio using the system GMM procedure described in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008).  Our findings are 
qualitatively identical in all cases.  Note that in our experimental design, a fixed effects specification is not 
appropriate.  By construction, all of the sample firms exhibit a large shift in leverage.  Labeling such a shift as a 
‘fixed effect,’ would mask much of the information about leverage dynamics that we seek to uncover.  [16] 
 
following the jump year.  Due to attrition, sample sizes vary by the length of the period over 
which we are measuring the changes.  Thus, the reported change in leverage at each interval is 
the average change from year 0 to year t for firms that exist in year t.  The changes in leverage 
from year 0 to year 7 reported in Panel B are similar to those implied by the average levels of 
leverage reported in Panel A.  All categories across all time horizons exhibit a trend back 
towards pre-jump leverage levels; however, while leverage continues to decrease, all categories 
continue to exhibit positive excess leverage on average even at the seven year mark.  Across all 
categories, the mean leverage remains a significantly positive 0.11 above the target seven years 
after the pro-active jump. 
The results from Table 5 indicate that the leverage increases observed in the sample are 
neither short term movements, nor movements to a new, permanent target ratio.  If firms 
executed the debt placement to address a pressing need, but were strongly opposed to the high 
leverage, we would expect the excess leverage levels to be short lived with aggressive 
rebalancing following the initial jump.  The post jump rebalancing behavior does not appear to 
differ drastically between the INVESTMENT, PAYOUT and WORKING CAPITAL motivation 
categories, while the OPERATIONS category firms appear to rebalance more aggressively.  The 
high attrition rate in the OPERATIONS category indicates that there may be survival bias at 
work.  It is possible that, following a negative earnings shock, the firm’s survival is strongly 
related to its ability to get its leverage ratio back in line with pre shock levels.  Nonetheless, the 
average rebalancing activity of the sample as a whole gives the impression that, while firms may 
be interested in moving back towards a target, there does not appear to be any great urgency. 
 
3.2.  Do firms pro-actively rebalance towards leverage targets? [17] 
 
One method by which companies can pro-actively reduce leverage is to issue equity.  To 
explore whether the firms in our sample pursue a pro-active strategy of increased equity 
issuances, we analyze observed values of Compustat D108, sale of common and preferred stock.  
This data item captures various ways of introducing equity into a firm’s capital structure ranging 
from proceeds from the exercise of employee options to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), which 
tend to be larger.  We define large issuances as those that exceed 5% of market assets.  The time 
series of equity issuances is plotted in Figures 3A and 3B over the period from 3 years prior to 
the jump to 7 years after.  While small issuances are commonplace and the percentage of firms 
engaging in such activity is relatively unchanged through time, large issuances not only fail to 
increase, but appear to drop dramatically after the jump in leverage, the opposite of what active 
rebalancing would imply.  The proportion of firms engaging in a large equity issuance ranges 
from 16% to 23% in the three years prior to the jump but never exceeds 10.5% in any of the 
seven years after the jump.  It is difficult to justify this reduction on the basis of cost sensitivity.  
There is no reason to believe that transaction costs associated with large equity issuances would 
differ substantially between the pre and post-jump periods.  Moreover, if anything, we would 
expect that firms would be less sensitive to these costs following a large increase in leverage 
since the probability of distress increases with higher levels of leverage.   
An alternative explanation is that the post-jump period is the ‘normal’ behavior and firms 
executed the debt issuances to offset abnormally high equity issuances in the years prior to the 
leverage jump.  However, there are several reasons to be skeptical of this explanation.  First, the 
leverage increasing transactions push the sample firms well above the estimated target.  Second, 
the subsequent evolution of the sample firms’ leverage ratios implies that the firms seek to move 
towards lower leverage levels, albeit slowly, over the years following the jump.  This implies [18] 
 
that the jump itself was not a rebalancing activity.  Finally, evidence presented in Fama and 
French (2005) supports the notion that the higher, pre-jump, large issuance activity is more 
consistent with observed issuance activity in the general population. 
While the decrease in large equity issuance activity is surprising in and of itself, it is even 
more striking to observe many firms actually increasing equity payout.  Unlike dividends, 
repurchases are not sticky, so any repurchases or dividend increases can be viewed as 
discretionary rather than obligatory.  Increased payouts subsequent to the initial jump use cash 
that could otherwise have been used to retire debt if the firms were aggressively pursuing a 
target.  In other words, payout increases are discretionary diversions of cash away from debt 
reduction.   
Table 6 reports pro forma mean leverage ratios if firms making discretionary payout 
increases had instead applied these funds to debt reduction.  These data are also plotted in Figure 
4.  Since the average firm continues to exhibit excess leverage of 0.11 at year 7, it is notable that 
this figure could have been reduced by over 70% to 0.03 if cash used for discretionary payout 
increases had simply been applied to debt reduction.
12  It thus appears that the sample firms 
could have adjusted their capital structure towards long run targets without incurring any 
significant transaction cost, but instead chose otherwise.  Taken together, these results support 
the notion that while firms appear to be rebalancing, their actions are not as pro-active as would 
be expected under traditional capital structure models.   
 
3.3.  The response to deficits and surpluses 
                                                 
12 Approximately 2/3 of the discretionary payouts are share repurchases and 1/3 are dividend increases.  Thus both 
payout methods contribute to the observed phenomenon in an economically meaningful manner.  
 [19] 
 
Further insight can be gained by analyzing how the sample firms adjust their capital 
structure (if at all) in response to subsequent cash flow deficits and surpluses.  We define a 
Financial Surplus as: 
                       ,     1                          
where OCF is operating cash flow, DIV(t-1) is the dividend payout from the prior year, I is net 
investment, ΔW is the change in working capital and ΔCash is the change in cash and short term 
investments.
13  In other words, taking observed values of operating cash flow, prior year 
dividend, net investment and working capital changes (other than changes in cash) as given, 
financial surplus captures discretionary cash that the firm can pay out to equity holders, use to 
reduce debt or stockpile as cash reserves.  Although this definition is close to the ‘financing 
surplus/deficit’ used in Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Byoun (2008), we make two 
modifications that are necessary for our purposes.  First, we use prior period dividend as opposed 
to current period dividend because we view a dividend increase as a discretionary use of surplus 
funds rather than an amount that should be taken as given when calculating the surplus.   
Secondly, we back out change in cash from change in net working capital.  This allows us to take 
a step back and calculate the surplus prior to the firm’s choice regarding the use or retention of 
cash, whereas previous specifications define surplus after the cash decision has been made.   
Under our definition, a firm would not have a smaller surplus simply because they chose to 
stockpile cash. 
For years +1 to +7, there are 5,831 firm years exhibiting surpluses and 5,963 exhibiting 
deficits.  As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the median surplus is $3.85 million.  The median firm 
uses most (82%) of the surplus to reduce debt. 
                                                 
13 For firms with a value of ‘.C’ for D274 (change in cash) in the Compustat database, this figure has been 
consolidated with D236 (Working Capital Change – other).  To maintain consistency in the FS calculation, we 
replace .C with the change observed on the balance sheet and reduce D236 by the corresponding amount. 
(13) [20] 
 
The results in Panel B of Table 7 report that financing deficits subsequent to the jump are 
covered predominantly with more debt.  This is surprising for several reasons.  First, it would 
seem to indicate that the extraordinary increase in leverage resulting from the jump did not 
exhaust the debt capacity of the firms.  These are not firms that had already moved back to 
target; the average excess leverage among the deficit firms engaging in further borrowing is 0.22.  
Further, since these firms were required to access external financing to cover the deficit, most 
capital structure models would predict that they should access equity since, on average, they 
appear to be well above their long-run target. 
In Table 8, we split the surplus and deficit firm-years according to whether the firm is 
above or below the estimated target leverage at the time.  Not surprisingly, given our sample 
construction, the vast majority of observations are above target.  To allow for direct comparison 
to leverage, Scaled Financial Surplus (SFS) is defined as: 
        
    
    
 
Comparing ∆ML vertically within each column, it is clear that the target has some impact 
on marginal financing decisions.  At the median, a firm that realizes a cash surplus while above 
target reduces leverage by 0.05 while a firm that realizes a surplus while below the target also 
reduces leverage, but only by 0.02, a significantly lower figure.  Similarly, at the median, a firm 
that realizes a cash deficit while above target increases leverage by 0.02 while a firm that realizes 
a cash deficit while below target increases by a significantly larger amount, 0.04. 
However, consideration of the target is not the only force at work as seen in a horizontal 
comparison within each row.  At the median, a firm that realizes a cash deficit while below target 
increases leverage by 0.04 while a firm that realizes a surplus while below the target decreases 
leverage by 0.02.  Similarly perplexing, at the median, a firm that realizes a cash surplus while 
(14) [21] 
 
above target reduces leverage by 0.05 compared to a firm that realizes a deficit while above the 
target increases leverage by 0.02.  Further movement away from target for firms necessitating 
external financing runs contrary to a policy of active rebalancing. 
In Table 9, we evaluate the effects of financial surpluses while controlling for other 
determinants of leverage changes – e.g, operating earnings (EBIT), stock price performance, the 
book value of total assets, the ratio of market value to book value of assets, and the ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets.  EBIT is scaled by market assets and fixed assets are scaled by book assets.  
Stock price performance is measured as the log one-year stock return.  In the OLS model, t-
statistics (in parentheses) are computed using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors, while the Z-statistics in the logit model are computed using the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator.
14   
Columns 1 & 2 of Table 9 report OLS estimates with the change in total debt scaled by 
market assets as the dependent variable.  In column 1, the estimates are restricted to firms 
realizing a financial surplus; that is, SFS is positive.  The negative and significant coefficient on 
SFS indicates that financial surpluses play an important role in the decision to retire debt.   
Further, while the dummy variable denoting firms above their target leverage is insignificant, the 
interaction of this dummy with the SFS variable is highly significant.  This implies that the 
relationship between surplus cash flow and debt reduction is even stronger when the firm is 
above its long run target leverage ratio.  In column 2, the same model is estimated for firms 
realizing a negative financial surplus, or in other words, a financial deficit.  Again, the 
coefficient on the SFS variable is highly significant suggesting a strong relationship between 
financial deficits and debt issuances.  Notably, this relationship is not affected by the firms’ 
                                                 
14 We also estimate models in which standard errors are clustered by firm, by year, and by both firm and year 
(Petersen 2009).  Because the results do not differ from those in Table 9 in any meaningful way, they are not 
reported in a table. [22] 
 
current leverage ratio relative to the target as the excess leverage dummy and interaction term are 
not significant. 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) argue that many tests of leverage ratios suffer from a lack of 
power and suggest an increased focus on issuance decisions.  To address this concern, we report 
marginal effects from a logit model estimating the probability of debt issuance and equity 
issuance for deficit firms in columns 3 and 4 and debt reduction and equity repurchases for 
surplus firms in columns 5 and 6.  All independent regressors other than the dummy variable in 
the logit model are scaled by standard deviation; thus, the marginal effects can be interpreted as 
the change in probability resulting from a one standard deviation change in the variable rather 
than a one unit change.  The variables are scaled because a one unit change in ratios typically 
bounded by 1 can be difficult to interpret.  As in Hovakimian (2004), we exclude dual equity and 
debt issues.  We require the financing activity considered in the dependent variable to constitute 
at least 1% of market assets so that the activity is deemed to be ‘meaningful.’  Failure to impose 
this threshold could result in, for example, a large debt issuance being excluded due to a 
diminutive equity issuance via employee compensation or the like, which would cloud the 
inference drawn from our estimates.   
Under the assumption that firms actively rebalance towards a target leverage ratio, we 
expect that positive excess leverage in firms with a positive financing deficit will have a negative 
effect on the probability of debt issuance (as opposed to equity).  Contrary to this prediction, 
however, we find little evidence in columns 3 and 4 that the likelihood of either debt or equity 
issuance is related to the firms position above or below target.  Instead, it is the SFS variable that 
has a highly significant relationship with the probabilities of both debt and equity issuance. [23] 
 
When the probabilities of debt retirement and equity repurchases are conditioned upon 
financing surpluses, evidence of active rebalancing appears but cash flow realizations remain 
important.  As reported in columns 5 and 6, the SFS variable remains significant at the 5% and 
1% levels respectively, but the dummy variable denoting positive excess leverage is now 
statistically significant in both specifications.  That is, conditional on a financial surplus, the 
likelihood of debt reduction (share repurchase) is positively (negatively) related to whether the 
firm exhibits positive excess leverage.   
Taken together, the results in Table 9 confirm that while there is some evidence that firms 
manage their leverage ratios towards a target, the evolution of the firm’s leverage ratio appears to 
be driven primarily by financial surpluses and deficits rather than a determined pursuit of a 
target. 
 
3.4.   Alternative explanations 
  One explanation for our findings is that our sample selection process is biased towards 
identifying firms with high adjustment costs and those for which we underestimate initial target 
leverage ratios.  That is, if adjustment costs are high, a firm will rebalance only when they are a 
long way from their target leverage ratio.  Thus, by limiting the sample to those firms that choose 
to increase leverage through a substantial debt issue, our sample picks up only those firms who 
have chosen to rebalance towards a higher leverage ratio, and whose high adjustment costs 
prevented them from doing so earlier.  Note that, under this explanation, the initial leverage 
increase that we observe is a move towards the ‘true’ target. 
  There are at least three reasons why we consider this explanation implausible.  First, such 
large frictions appear at odds with Iliev and Welch’s (2009) finding that the average non-stock-[24] 
 
return caused change in leverage is about 9% per year.  Large adjustment costs are also difficult 
to rationalize in the face of pervasive unused lines of credit (Sufi 2009), access to the 
commercial paper market (Kahl, Shivdasani & Wang 2008), and low-cost (non-SEO) methods of 
issuing equity (Fama and French 2005).  Second, if the leverage changes we observe are 
movements towards the ‘true’ target, we expect that the sample firms would either stockpile the 
cash from the debt offer or use the proceeds to reduce equity.  Instead, we observe that the 
leverage increases are a response to investment needs.  Third, our evidence on subsequent 
rebalancing implies that our estimates of the target are economically meaningful.  That is, the 
sample firms appear to rebalance towards our estimate of the target rather than treat the post-
jump leverage ratio as if it is the true target.   
  Alternatively, it is possible that we have underestimated the post-jump target leverage 
ratio.  For example, perhaps prior to the initial leverage increase, the sample firms have large, 
unexercised real options.  Upon debt issuance, the option is exercised and the target leverage 
ratio increases.  If our target estimation procedure fails to pick up the impact of the exercise of 
the growth option, we might underestimate the post-jump target and, therefore, underestimate the 
extent to which the sample firms rebalance towards the target in the post-jump years.   
There are several reasons why we do not think that our results can be explained by an 
underestimate of post-jump target leverage ratios.  First, to the extent that market-to-book ratios 
capture growth options, our estimate of target leverage will pick up the impact of the exercise of 
the growth option through the change in the firm’s market-to-book ratio.  Empirically, we do 
observe a substantial decline in the market-to-book ratio of the sample firms following the initial 
jump.  However, the resulting impact on target leverage is far too small to account for our 
findings.  Even if market-to-book ratios are just noisy proxies for the true growth opportunities, [25] 
 
our empirical estimates of Eq (2) imply that the marginal impact of growth options on leverage 
ratios, though statistically significant, is economically small.  Second, because the cross-section 
of leverage ratios is explained primarily by industry leverage ratios (which are measured without 
error), it is implausible that we underestimate the post-jump target leverage by 0.11, our estimate 
of year 7 excess leverage.  Finally, we again note that the sample firms appear to rebalance 
towards our estimate of the target rather than treat the post-jump leverage ratio as if it is the true 
(new) target.   
 
4.   Discussion and Relation to Capital Structure Literature 
As previously mentioned, our findings are difficult to reconcile with some aspects of 
traditional capital structure models.  For example, in standard tradeoff models, firms balance the 
benefits of debt (e.g. tax benefits, reductions in agency costs) against the costs of debt (e.g. costs 
of underinvestment, distress costs) to arrive at a value maximizing leverage level.  Although the 
magnitude of various costs and benefits of debt remain a matter of considerable debate, tradeoff 
models predict that firms will manage their capital structure towards the target leverage ratio that 
maximizes value.
15  Firms might deviate from target leverage if there are large adjustment costs, 
but any pro-active changes in leverage should represent either a deliberate rebalancing towards 
the firm’s long-run target or a movement to a new target leverage.
16   
Contrary to these predictions, our sample leverage increases represent deliberate 
decisions to temporarily move the firm away from estimates of its long-run target leverage ratio.  
                                                 
15 For evidence on the magnitude of debt-related costs and benefits, see Graham (2000), Harvey, Lins and Roper 
(2004), and Almeida and Philippon (2007). 
 
16 See Leary and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith 
(2008) for recent evidence on the role of adjustment costs in capital structure rebalancing decisions. 
 [26] 
 
Moreover, although the sample firms do appear to rebalance their capital structures towards a 
long-run target in the years following the initial leverage increase, the nature of the rebalancing 
implies that the movement towards the long-run target is not a first-order consideration.  First, 
the rebalancing process is quite slow.
17  Leverage ratios are still significantly above target levels 
seven years after the year of the initial jump.  The persistence of excess leverage cannot be 
explained by substantial adjustment costs because we report evidence that many firms increase 
payouts to equity holders in the years subsequent to the initial leverage increase.  If these funds 
had been used instead for debt reduction, average debt ratios in the sample would have been 
considerably closer to their long-run targets.  Similarly, we find little evidence that the sample 
firms pro-actively seek to rebalance their capital structures through equity issues in the post-
jump period.  In fact, we find a substantial decrease in the proportion of firms completing large 
equity issuances in the years immediately following the leverage increase.  Such behavior 
represents a puzzle for traditional capital structure models in that even if large equity issuances 
are costly, such costs would remain relatively unchanged following the leverage increase while 
the theoretical benefits (in the form of a movement towards a value-maximizing capital 
structure) would increase.  The bottom line is that both the initial leverage increase and the 
subsequent rebalancing behavior of the sample firms are inconsistent with a model in which 
managing towards a long-run target is a first-order determinant of capital structure decisions. 
  Our findings are also difficult to reconcile with studies that suggest that firms target an 
optimal leverage ‘range’ [e.g., Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Leary and Roberts (2005) 
and Strebulaev (2007)].  In these dynamic tradeoff models, firms tolerate deviation from their 
long run target as long as this deviation falls within an upper and lower bound, perhaps due, in 
                                                 
17  Similarly, Harford, Klasa, and Wolcott (2009) report that leverage ratios revert slowly back towards target levels 
following debt-financed acquisitions. 
 [27] 
 
part, to adjustment costs.  Even in these models, however, any pro-active change in leverage 
should be towards the value-maximizing target, a prediction that is contradicted by our 
observation that a substantial number of our sample firms further increase their leverage when 
faced with a cash flow deficit despite already being well above our estimate of their target 
leverage ratio.  At a minimum, therefore, our findings imply that there is an extremely wide 
range of leverage ratios over which managers behave as if they are relatively indifferent.   
However, if this is true, it reinforces our conclusion that managing leverage levels is not a first 
order concern for managers. 
Some of our findings can be viewed as being consistent with the pecking order model 
developed by Myers (1984) and Myers & Majluf (1984) in that firms appear to utilize a large 
debt increase to implement operating plans for which they lack sufficient internal funds.   
Moreover, the fact that the sample firms seek additional debt financing when faced with a 
funding deficit in the years subsequent to the initial jump is also consistent with pecking order 
predictions.  Nonetheless, several other findings in our study are difficult to reconcile with the 
pecking order model.  For example, the pecking order predicts that firms will use financing 
surpluses to first build up cash reserves, then pay down existing debt before repurchasing equity 
or increasing dividends.  Contrary to this prediction, however, we observe that many firms in our 
sample simultaneously pay down debt and repurchase equity in the years subsequent to the 
leverage increase.  Moreover, we find little evidence that firms use either the initial leverage 
increase or subsequent surpluses to build cash reserves.   
  Many of our findings are consistent with the model of capital structure dynamics 
developed in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2010).  In their model, financial flexibility in 
the form of unused debt capacity plays a central role in capital structure dynamics.  The critical [28] 
 
departure of their model from most capital structure models is the recognition of inter-temporal 
dependencies in financing activity.  The opportunity cost of borrowing in the current period is 
the potential inability to borrow in future periods.  Thus, ex ante optimal financial policies 
preserve the ability of the firm to access the capital market ex post in the event of unexpected 
earnings shortfalls or investment opportunities.  Among other predictions, the model implies that 
unexpected capital needs will often lead to debt or equity issues that intentionally move the 
issuing company away from its long-run target debt ratio.  Moreover, subsequent adjustments to 
the firm’s leverage ratio will depend on cash flow realizations, the evolution of the firm’s 
investment opportunity set, and capital market conditions.  Therefore, marginal financing 
decisions will not necessarily follow a strict pecking order, nor will firms necessarily adjust very 
quickly to a target leverage ratio.  Our findings are broadly consistent with these predictions.  
Nonetheless, the fact that we observe increased equity payouts in our sample firms when such 
cash surpluses could be used to pay down debt implies a slower rebalancing towards long-run 
target leverage ratios than is implied in DeAngelo et al. (2010).  
Tserlukevich (2008) also presents a model of capital structure dynamics that features 
lumpy debt issuances, endogenous investment, and slow mean reversion in debt ratios.  Although 
our findings are consistent with many of these features, our findings imply a more active 
rebalancing process than is modeled in the Tserlukevich (2008) model.  In his model, leverage 
ratios decline with positive demand shocks due to increases in the value of growth options.  
While our results do not contradict this effect, we also find that firms actively pay down debt 
when they generate surplus funds.    
Finally, our findings have implications for studies that use the speed of adjustment 
towards estimates of target leverage ratios as a test of tradeoff models of capital structure.  Prior [29] 
 
studies [e.g., Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007), 
Huang and Ritter (2009), and Iliev and Welch (2009)] report relatively slow speeds of 
adjustment towards estimated targets.  Our findings imply that such slow speeds of adjustment 
are due, in part, to firms deliberately issuing debt that moves the firm away from its long-run 
target debt ratio in order to fund new investment opportunities.  As DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Whited (2010) point out, such behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of 
target leverage ratios, and results in measures of the speed of adjustment that materially 
understate the incentives of firms to manage towards such targets.   
 
5.   Conclusion 
  Our analysis of large leverage increases indicates that these debt issuances represent pro-
active movements away from long-run target leverage ratios in response to operating (primarily 
investment) needs.  The sample firms subsequently rebalance towards their long-run leverage 
target; however, the subsequent debt reductions are neither rapid, nor the result of pro-active 
attempts (e.g. equity issues) to rebalance the firm’s capital structure towards its long-run target.  
On average, the sample firms could rebalance nearly to their target leverage ratio if they simply 
avoid increasing dividends or repurchasing shares.  Yet they choose not to do so.  Moreover, 
many sample firms willingly take on even more debt when faced with cash flow deficits, despite 
already being substantially above target leverage.  
  Overall, our findings support the idea that unused debt capacity is an important source of 
financial flexibility.  As such, they are consistent with DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007), who 
argue that financial flexibility is a critical missing link in connecting capital structure theory with 
observed firm behavior.  Moreover, such a view is consistent with that of surveyed CFOs, who [30] 
 
state that financial flexibility is the most important determinant of capital structure (Graham & 
Harvey 2001).   
Among our sample firms, there is little evidence that firms use outstanding cash balances 
as a source of flexibility.  Although one could argue that our experimental design of isolating 
firms with large debt increases is biased against finding an important role for cash balances as a 
source of flexibility, we note that Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2008) arrive at the same 
conclusion using a different experimental design.  A possible implication of our findings, 
therefore, is that at any point in time, a firm’s leverage ratio consists of both permanent and 
transitory components.  The permanent component represents the company’s long-run target, 
while the transitory component reflects the evolution of the firm’s cash flows and operating 
needs.  When firms have funding needs, they borrow to take advantage of opportunities.  When 
subsequent cash flows are sufficiently high relative to operating needs, they pay down this debt 
towards their long-run target leverage ratio.  This behavior gives rise to leverage patterns that 
give the appearance that managers are paying little attention to the costs and benefits of debt.  
However, a more appropriate interpretation may be that that empirical models for estimating 
target leverage ratios fail to properly account for all of the relevant costs and benefits.  That is, 
managers may perceive the benefits of optimizing with respect to traditional determinants of 
leverage (i.e. tax, distress costs) as being relatively low, and the costs of potential 
underinvestment as being relatively high.   
  In this sense, our findings complement recent studies that propose a prominent role for 
transitory debt sources – e.g. lines of credit and commercial paper programs – in capital 
structure.  For example, Sufi (2009) shows that revolving credit agreements comprise a large 
proportion of the outstanding debt obligations of most firms.  Moreover, the average firm has [31] 
 
unused lines of credit that are twice as large as the line of credit capacity that has been utilized.  
Similarly, Kahl, Shivdasani, and Wang (2008) conclude that commercial paper provides 
financial flexibility to firms with uncertain prospects and funding needs.  As pointed out in 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2010), the use of these types of transitory debt sources 
implies that firms arrange their capital structures in a way such that they consist ex ante of 
unused debt capacity that can be used ex post should funding needs arise.     Appendix A 
Calculation of OCF: 
When D318 equals 1, 2 or 3: 
OCF = D123+D124+D126+D106+D213+D217+D218 
where D123 is income before extraordinary items, D124 is extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations, D126 is deferred taxes, D106 is equity in net loss, D213 is loss on 
the sale of PPE and/or investments, D217 is funds from operations and D218 is other sources 
of funds. 
When D318 equals 7: 
OCF=D308-D302-D303-D304-D305-D307+D314 
where D308 is net cash flow from operations, D302 is decrease in accounts receivable, D303 
is decrease in inventory, D304 is increase in accounts payable and accrued liabilities, D305 is 
increase in accrued taxes, D307 is other change in assets and liabilities and D314 is exchange 
rate effect. 
 
Calculation of I: 
When data318 equals 1, 2 or 3, net investment (I) is calculated as: 
I=D128+D129+D113+D219-D107-D109 
where D128 is capital expenditures, D129 is acquisitions, D113 is increase in other 
investments, D219 is other use of funds, D107 is proceeds from the sale of PPE and D109 is 
proceeds from the sale of investments. 
When data 318 equals 7, I is calculated as: 
I=D128+D129+D113-D107-D109 -D310 






Calculation of ∆W: 
When D318 equals 1, change in working capital (∆W) is calculated as:  
∆W=D236+D274 
where D236 is other change in working capital and D274 is increase in cash. 
When D318 equals 2 or 3, ∆W is calculated as above except the sign is reversed on D236. 
When D318 equals 7, ∆W is calculated as: 
∆W=D274-D302-D303-D304-D305-D307-D309-D312 
Where D309 is change in short term investments and D312 is other financing activities. 
(A5) 
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Lower Upper
Variable Median Mean Quartile Quartile
Pre-jump leverage 0.299 0.312 0.163 0.446
Post-jump leverage 0.545 0.559 0.434 0.680
Pre-jump excess leverage 0.023 0.038 -0.068 0.130
Post-jump excess leverage 0.240 0.272 0.165 0.353
Description of leverage changes
The sample includes 2,318 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm increases its market leverage
by at least 0.1to a levelthat is at least 0.1 above its estimated long-run target. Market leverage is defined as totaldebt
overthe sumoftotaldebt and market value of equity. We compare market leverage for the fiscal yearending just prior
to the jump year (Pre-jump leverage) with that for the fiscal year of the jump (Post-jump leverage). Excess leverage is
defined as the difference between the observed leverage and the firm's estimated target leverage.
Table 1
 
  Total Total
Year sample trackable Investment Working Cap Payout Operations
1971 35 32 24 8 0 0
1972 74 54 38 15 0 1
1973 177 124 69 55 0 0
1974 215 143 70 69 1 3
1975 22 16 7 8 1 0
1976 44 32 14 13 1 4
1977 96 76 40 29 4 3
1978 61 45 23 17 4 1
1979 78 46 29 14 1 2
1980 46 30 17 8 3 2
1981 82 63 43 16 4 0
1982 76 50 30 15 4 1
1983 34 27 10 10 4 3
1984 134 125 58 52 7 8
1985 91 83 41 32 6 4
1986 132 124 62 51 5 6
1987 113 106 51 44 7 4
1988 83 75 34 31 3 7
1989 74 68 39 23 4 2
1990 59 54 29 22 0 3
1991 25 22 10 5 1 6
1992 30 28 13 10 2 3
1993 24 22 11 7 1 3
1994 84 77 41 32 0 4
1995 75 72 42 28 1 1
1996 62 59 33 18 2 6
1997 94 84 47 20 6 11
1998 125 118 84 22 8 4
1999 73 65 49 13 1 2
2318 1920 1058 687 81 94
% of trackable firms 55% 36% 4% 5%
Motivation
Table 2
The sample includes 2,318 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm increases its market
leverage by at least 0.1to a level that is at least 0.1above its estimated long-run target. Market leverage is defined
as totaldebt overthe sumof totaldebt and market value of equity. A firmis considered trackable ifthe majority of
the cash proceeds from the debt issuance can be traced to a particular use. 1,920 ofthe sample firms are trackable.
The INVESTMENT motivation captures increases in capital expenditures and cash acquisitions, the WORKING 
CAPITAL motivation captures increases in working capital, the PAYOUT motivation captures dividend increases
and repurchases and the OPERATIONS motivation captures operational cash shortfalls resulting primarily from
earnings shocks.
Time profile of leverage increasing transactionsPanel A: Use of proceeds for main motivation
Main Motivation #
Mean % of debt used
for main motivation






Investment 1058 101% 97% 0.289 0.555
Working Capital 687 92% 86% 0.303 0.527
Operations 94 106% 86% 0.349 0.590
Payout 81 110% 103% 0.282 0.587
Panel B: Median changes during jump year
Main Motivation # OI change WC change CapEx change Acquisitions Payout change
Investment 1058 0.013 0.010 0.035 0.027 0.000
Working Capital 687 0.006 0.113 0.009 0.000 0.000
Operations 94 -0.139 -0.134 -0.007 0.000 0.000
Payout 81 0.005 -0.016 0.004 0.000 0.252
Table 3
Analysis of jump year activity by motivation
The trackable sample includes 2,109 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firmincreases its market leverage by at least 0.1 to a lev e lt h a ti s
at least 0.1 above its estimated long-run target. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. Firms are
categorized under a particularmotivation when the majority of cash proceeds fromthe debt issuance can be traced to a specific use. Panel A reports the mean
and median percentage of cash from the debt issuance that is used forthe motivation to which the firmis categorized. We compare leverage forthe fiscalyear
ending just prior to the jump year (Pre-jump leverage) with that forthe fiscalyear ofthe jump (Post-jump leverage). Panel Breports median changes in several
key variables during the jump year. Acquisitions are reported as the observed figure ratherthan the change. Each variable is scaled by jump yeartotal assets to
facilitate comparison across firms.  Panel A: Time series median cash holdings by motivation
# cash/TA # cash/TA # cash/TA # cash/TA
Pre-jump 1056 0.055 687 0.037 94 0.039 81 0.037
Post-jump 1058 0.033 687 0.039 94 0.031 81 0.031
Difference -0.023 0.001 -0.008 -0.006
(<0.0001) (0.417) (0.27) (0.128)










Median Median % of firms
DC / TA EC / TA with negative EC
Table 4
Cash Holdings
The trackable sample includes 1,920 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm increases its market
leverage by at least 0.1 to a level that is at least 0.1 above its estimated long-run target. Market leverage is defined as total
debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. Firms are categorized under a particular motivation when the
majority ofcash proceeds fromthe debt issuance can be traced to a specific use. Panel A compares median cash ratios within
each motivation category from the fiscal yearending just prior to the jump year with that forthe fiscalyear ofthe jump. The
cash ratio is defined as cash divided by totalassets. The difference is tested using a Wilcoxon (ranksum)test,p-values are in
parentheses. Panel B reports pro-forma discretionary and excess cash ratios. Pro forma Discretionary Cash (DC) is defined
as cash plus operating cash flowless uses of cash outside the primary motivation. It measures the amount of cash available
to the firmto execute a change in their respective motivation category. Pro forma Excess Cash (EC) is defined as DC less the
amount of cash used for their primary motivation. Both figures are scaled by pro forma total assets defined as total assets
less net debt issuance.
INVESTMENT
WORKING
CAPITAL OPERATIONS PAYOUTPanel A: Time series mean leverage by motivation
Years after
jump # ML Excess ML # ML Excess ML # ML Excess ML # ML Excess ML
0 1058 0.555 0.274 687 0.527 0.254 94 0.590 0.316 81 0.587 0.294
1 965 0.557 0.232 641 0.536 0.224 74 0.595 0.312 71 0.541 0.236
2 894 0.544 0.206 590 0.513 0.196 62 0.502 0.222 63 0.546 0.237
3 801 0.527 0.195 529 0.497 0.188 43 0.447 0.176 57 0.513 0.214
4 723 0.511 0.184 498 0.479 0.175 35 0.388 0.124 51 0.465 0.153
5 669 0.484 0.162 452 0.443 0.146 32 0.379 0.123 52 0.422 0.128
6 608 0.440 0.124 422 0.421 0.129 30 0.358 0.113 48 0.385 0.083
7 557 0.411 0.107 395 0.412 0.128 26 0.383 0.149 46 0.359 0.071
Panel B: Mean change in QML of surviving firms over various periods
# ΔML
Excess
year 3 # ΔML
Excess
year 5 # ΔML
Excess
year 7
Investment 801 -0.018 0.195 669 -0.066 0.162 557 -0.133 0.107
(0.034) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Working Capital 529 -0.027 0.188 452 -0.085 0.146 395 -0.108 0.128
(0.010) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Operations 43 -0.107 0.176 32 -0.175 0.123 26 -0.200 0.149
(0.009) (<.0001) (0.0004) (0.015) (0.0004) (0.006)
Payout 57 -0.049 0.214 52 -0.126 0.128 46 -0.193 0.071
(0.052) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.041)
All 1430 -0.025 0.193 1205 -0.078 0.153 1024 -0.128 0.114
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
jy to jy+3 jy to jy+5 jy to jy+7
Table 5
Evolution of leverage
The trackable sample includes 1,920 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm increases its market leverage by at least 0.1 to a level that is at least 0.1
above its estimated long-run target. Market leverage (ML)is defined as totaldebt overthe sumoftotaldebt and market value ofequity. Firms are categorized under a particular
motivation when the majority of cash proceeds from the debt issuance can be traced to a specific use. Excess leverage is defined as the difference between the observed
leverage and the firm's estimated target leverage. PanelA reports mean leverage and excess leverage forsurviving firms in each yearfrom the jump yearto seven years afterthe
jump, partitioned by primary motivation. Panel B reports the mean change in leverage for surviving firms over time horizons of three, five and seven years after the jump,
partitioned by primary motivation.  Mean excess leverage observed at the end of the measurement period is reported for each category.  P-values are in parentheses.
INVESTMENT WORKING CAPITAL OPERATIONS PAYOUTActual Pro forma
Years after jump # mean excess leverage mean excess leverage
0 1920 0.270 0.270
1 1750 0.232 0.226
2 1608 0.204 0.187
3 1430 0.193 0.165
4 1307 0.177 0.132
5 1205 0.153 0.079
6 1108 0.124 0.053
7 1024 0.114 0.031
Table 6
Pro forma excess leverage 
if cash used for discretionary payout increases was applied to debt reduction
The trackable sample includes 1,920 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm
increases its market leverage by at least 0.1 to a level that is at least 0.1 above its estimated long-run
target. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value ofequity.
Excess ML is defined as the difference between the observed market leverage and the firm's estimated
target. Pro forma adjusted leverage is computed by applying cash used for discretionary payout
(dividend increases and repurchases) to debt reduction. Pro forma excess leverage is defined as the
difference between the adjusted leverage and the firm's estimated target leverage.
 
 Panel A: Use of financial surpluses
25th 75th
Variable Mean Median Percentile Percentile
Financial Surplus ($MM) 37.20 3.85 1.23 13.59
Equity Issuance ($MM) 5.70 0.00 0.00 0.27
% of surplus used for debt reduction 77% 82% 29% 105%
% of surplus used for payout increase 14% 0% 0% 7%
% of surplus used for cash increase 7% 10% -9% 57%
Panel B: Coverage of financial deficits
Variable Median
Financial Deficit ($MM) 5.54
% of deficit covered by equity issuance 1%
% of deficit covered by debt issuance 78%
% of deficit covered by payout reduction 0%
% of deficit covered by cash reserves 6%
Avg excess leverage of firms covering with debt 0.22
Response to financial surpluses and deficits
Table 7
The trackable sample includes 1,920 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firmincreases its market leverage by at least 0.1 to
a levelthat is at least 0.1above its estimated long-run target. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum oftotal debt and market value
ofequity. Excess leverage is defined as the difference between the observed leverage and the firm's estimated target. In Panels A and B we track
the years subsequent to the jump and look at how firms react to the realization of a financial surplus or deficit. The surpluses sample includes
5,831 firm-year observations between 1972 and 2006 in which the firm realizes a positive financial surplus. Financial Surplus (FS) is defined as
operating cash flowless prioryeardividend less net investment less non-cash changes in working capital. The deficits sample includes 5,963firm-
year observations between 1972 and 2006 in which the firm realizes a negative financial surplus, otherwise known as a financial deficit. The
percentage used and percentage covered variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mute the effect of outliers on the observed
mean. 
SFS ΔML Excess Lev SFS ΔML Excess Lev
Mean 0.143 -0.064 0.280 Mean -0.118 0.015 0.248
Median 0.074 -0.050 0.259 Median -0.080 0.017 0.225
N4 , 7 2 1         4,721         4,721               N 4,644         4,644         4,644              
SFS ΔML Excess Lev SFS ΔML Excess Lev
Mean 0.103 -0.022 -0.114 Mean -0.121 0.065 -0.116
Median 0.053 -0.020 -0.096 Median -0.080 0.039 -0.093





Leverage changes partitioned by position relative to target and realization of financial surplus or deficit
The sample includes 11,477 firm-year observations between 1972 and 2006. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of
totaldebt and market value ofequity. Change in market leverage (ΔML)is the difference between leverage in the observation fiscalyear
and leverage in the yearimmeadiately preceeding it. Excess leverage is defined as the difference between the observed leverage and the
firm's estimated target leverage.  When excess leverage takes a positive (negative) value, the firm is labeled ABOVE (BELOW).  Financial 
Surplus (FS) is defined as operating cash flow less prior year dividend less net investment less non-cash changes in working capital.
Positive (negative)values ofFS are labeled SURPLUS (DEFICIT). Scaled Financial Surplus (SFS) is defined as FS divided by the sum
of total debt and market equity.  SFS is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
 
 
 CF realization Surplus Deficit
Dependent Variable SΔTD SΔTD Pr(Debt Issuance) Pr(Equity Issue) Pr(Debt Reduction) Pr(Repurchase)
SFS -0.215 -0.464 -0.195 0.114 0.045 0.039
(2.87)** (6.88)** (3.24)** (3.29)** (2.13)* (3.09)**
D(above) 0.009 -0.006 -0.024 -0.040 0.056 -0.092
(1.26) (0.86) (0.72) (1.76) (2.18)* (4.19)**
SFS*D(above) -0.574 0.002 -0.045 -0.070 0.175 -0.016
(7.37)** (0.02) (0.86) (2.01)* (5.92)** (1.38)
EBIT/MA 0.01 0.014 0.041 -0.010 0.013 0.044
(1.88) (0.79) (0.41) (0.60) 0.88 (2.04)*
Log StkRtn 0.018 0.01 0.017 0.025 -0.014 0.004
(4.83)** (1.79) (1.37) (3.41)** (2.27)* (0.94)
Log TA 0.003 0.01 0.050 -0.005 -0.002 0.012
(2.95)** (6.64)** (4.88)** (0.89) (0.36) (2.01)*
Mkt/Book -0.011 0 -0.351 0.003 0.227 -0.006
(4.10)** (0.14) (4.88)** (0.66) (3.73)** (0.21)
Fixed Assets -0.004 0.006 0.016 -0.007 0.024 -0.013
(0.39) (0.65) (1.83) (1.09) (3.55)** (1.96)*
Constant -0.013 -0.036
(1.19) (3.78)**
Σ (SFS & Interaction) -0.79 -0.46
R-squared 0.64 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.04
Log Likelihood -2310.4 -1312.7 -2092.6 -1344.4
Observations 4,103      3,748      3,748                        3,748                        4,103                        4,103                       
Table 9
Effects of Financial Surpluses on the change in total debt and the probability of financing activities
The sample includes 7,851 firm-yearobservations between 1972 and 2006. Firms are classified as issuing (repurchasing) a security when the net amount
issued (repurchased)exceeds 1% ofthe market value of assets. Scaled change in totaldebt (SΔTD)is defined as the dollar change in totaldebt fromt-1
to t divided by market assets at time t. Market leverage is defined as totaldebt overthe sumof totaldebt and market value of equity. Excess leverage is
defined as the difference between the observed leverage and the firm's estimated target leverage. When excess leverage takes a positive value, the
dummy variable D(above) takes a value of 1. Financial Surplus (FS) is defined as operating cash flow less prior yeardividend less net investment less
non-cash changes in working capital. Scaled FinancialSurplus (SFS)is defined as FSdivided by the sumoftotaldebt and market equity. Columns 1 &2
report OLSregression results with scaled change in totaldebt as the dependent variable. Columns 3 -6 report marginal effects froma logit modelwhere
the dependent bianary variable takes a value of 1 when the firm took the specifed action.  All independent variables other than the dummy were scaled by 
standard deviation in the logit model. Standard errors are corrected forheteroscedasticity. Absolute value of t statistics (OLS)and zstatistics (logit)are
in parentheses and are significant at 5% when marked with * and at 1% when marked with **.  R-squared figures for logit model are psudo R-squared.
Conditional upon Deficit Conditional upon Surplus 
 
 
Fig. 1. Number of observed pro-active leverage jumps over sample period. The sample includes 2,318 firm-year observations 
between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm increases its market leverage by at least 0.1 to a level that is at least 0.1 above its 



















Leverage jumps by year 
 
Fig. 2. Evolution of leverage, excess leverage and estimated long run target leverage of sample firms during seven years after the 
leverage changing transaction.  The trackable sample includes 1,920 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the 
firm increases its market leverage by at least 0.1 to a level that is at least 0.1 above its estimated long-run target.  Market leverage 























Fig. 3A and 3B. Observed equity issuance activity of sample firms over period from three years prior to jump to seven years after 
the jump.  The trackable sample includes 1,920 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm increases its 
market leverage by at least 0.1 to a level that is at least 0.1 above its estimated long-run target.  Market leverage is defined as 
total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity.  For each year from three years prior to the jump to seven years 
after the jump, we report the mean percentage of firms issuing equity, defined as any positive value observed under Compustat 
data item 108 (sale of common and preferred stock), and the mean percentage of firms executing a seasoned equity offering, 




















































































Large equity issuances around jump 
 
Fig. 4. Pro forma excess leverage evolution over the seven years following the jump if discretionary payout increases were used 
for debt reduction.  The trackable sample includes 1,920 firm-year observations between 1971 and 1999 in which the firm 
increases its market leverage by at least 0.1 to a level that is at least 0.1 above its estimated long-run target.  Market leverage is 
defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity.  Excess leverage is defined as the difference between 
the observed leverage and the firm's estimated target leverage.  Pro forma adjusted leverage is computed by applying cash used 
for discretionary payout, dividend increases and repurchases, to debt reduction.  Pro forma excess leverage is defined as the 

























Pro forma excess leverage evolution if 
discretionary payout increases were used for 
debt reduction
Mean excess leverage (observed) Mean excess leverage (pro forma)